The Week of April 25, 2021: On This Day In SCOTUS History
This week we will cover the Erie Doctrine, the first U.S. greenbacks, an entrapment case where the gov’t provided the illegal drugs, guns on campus and the commerce clause, eliminating jurors based on race, and the value of a dog.
Cases are presented in chronological order. IRAC format used where possible.
Disclaimer: These cases have not been Shepardized. This article is not legal advice. Those seeking legal advice should consult an attorney.
1871, May 1
Legal Tender Cases — Necessary & Proper Clause
Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1871)
Facts:
In 1862, the U.S. Congress passes the Legal Tender Act, authorizing the use of paper notes to pay the government’s bills — specifically, it’s costly Civil War debts. This was deemed necessary after its gold and silver reserves, used for specie or coin, were depleted.
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870), the Supreme Court ruled that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional. Only a year later, in Knox v. Lee (known as the Legal Tender Cases), the Court took up the issue again.
Issue:
Whether Congress has the power to authorized paper notes.
Rule:
The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 5: Congress has the power “to coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.”
The Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18: Congress shall have the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” The authorized use of paper money was considered “necessary and proper
Analysis (Justice Strong):
The Constitution gives Congress the power to, specifically, coin money. It was determined that this power does not include issuing greenbacks, because a coin holds the intrinsic value of the metal it was minted from, while a greenback does not. A treasury note, or a promissory note, would not qualify under Clause 18.
However, over time the relation in value was lost such that the equivalent value of gold did not match the equivalent value of silver. As gold became scarce, it’s intrinsic value went up relative to silver, then when gold became plentiful during the gold rush, the intrinsic value of gold decreased relative to silver. Congress, thus, made efforts to bring the value of the coins in line with their intrinsic value.
As with other cultures where coins may become worn down to a lesser weight, or where coins may have holes in them, the portability and convenience of the legal tender made up for what they lacked in intrinsic value.
The opinion goes on to quote Chief Justice Marshall regarding the necessary and proper clause: “‘Let the end be legitimate; let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all the means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.’”
The question then is whether it is necessary and proper “that treasury notes should be made a legal tender for antecedent debts. Is it appropriate and plainly adapted to the power to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to suppress insurrections or repel invasions, or even to any of these powers united?”
The opinion then goes on an extended exploration, ad infinitum, of the words “necessary” and “proper” in turn, framed around the arguments in Hepburn v. Griswold.
Held:
Hepburn v. Griswold is reversed and the Legal Tender Act is Constitutional.
Note: The Supreme Court’s reversal, from one year to the next, was possible due to a radical shifting of the court. You will often see the story of that shift when researching this case. There was enough to focus on here without that.
1897, April 26
Dogs as Property
Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897)
Facts:
A pregnant and “valuable Newfoundland bitch, registered in the American Kennel’s stud book” was killed by an oncoming electric train (trolley). The owner sued the railroad company for negligence, claiming the value of the dog. The railroad countered by claiming owner negligence, and that they owe him nothing in any case since he did not register the dog.
Issue:
Whether a law of the state of Louisiana requiring dogs to be placed upon the assessment rolls, and limiting any recovery by the owner to the value fixed by himself for the purpose of taxation is constitutional under 14th Amendment due process.
Rule:
Dogs owned by citizens of Louisiana a) are personal property, b) shall be entitled to protection of the law only if placed upon the assessment roles, and c) in civil action, the owner cannot recover beyond the amount of the value of the dog as the owner declared in the assessment.
Analysis:
Unlike horses, cattle, sheep, and other domesticated animals, dogs have no intrinsic value. They are not useful as beasts of burden, do not provide drink and are not converted to food. They are “kept for pleasure, curiosity, or caprice,” just as are cats and birds. They can be feral or domesticated. It’s nearly impossible to distinguish the value or worthlessness, for purposes of statute, from one breed of dog to another.
The Opinion goes on to cite laws upheld throughout the country that allows the licensing of dog and the killing of uncollared dogs. This falls under legitimate government powers to raise revenue (tax), and under police powers to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community.
Held:
There is nothing in this law that is not within the police power, or of which the plaintiff has the right to complain, and the judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. As such, since the plaintiff did not register his dog, he was not entitled to recovery.
1938, April 25
The Erie Doctrin: Limits on the Federal Court’s Power in Diversity Jurisdiction
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
This is a famous case that makes up the standard law school civil procedure curriculum (although, my law school chose to skip it — understandable given the amount of ground that needs to be covered in civ pro).
Facts:
(Another railroad accident!) Tompkins was struck by what seems to have been an open door from a passing freight train has he walked a well-worn path along the tracks. He sued the Erie Railroad Co. for negligence. Erie cited Pennsylvania law that said that people travelling long these paths are trespassers.
Issue:
When a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction, what law does it apply: state or federal?
Rule:
Rules of Decision Act (in pertinent part): The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution on Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rule of decisions in civil action, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1841): Interpreted “the laws of the several states” in the Rules of Decision Act to mean legislative acts. As such, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest court (i.e. case law).
Analysis (Justice Brandeis):
Swift v. Tyson had failed in a number of ways. 1) The Rules of Decision Act was misinterpreted in Swift. 2) Contrary to the stated goal of providing equal protection through uniformity of law throughout the country, Swift actually prevented uniformity in administration of the law of the state. 3) Whether the law of the state shall be by statute or by court is not of federal concern — interference of either, except as permitted, is an invasion.
Held:
The Circuit Court of Appeals errored in ruling that the question of liability was one of general law and, as such, declined to enforce State common law. Reversed and remanded.
This holding reversed nearly one hundred years of precedent and would be known as the Erie Doctrine.
1965, April 26
Refinement of Erie Doctrine’s Diversity Jurisdiction
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
Twenty-seven years after Erie, the Court revisited the question of diversity jurisdiction.
Facts:
Mrs. Louise Plumer Osgood, a citizen of Massachusetts, injured a citizen of Ohio in a car accident in South Carolina. Mrs. Osgood was deceased at the time of filing (from the accident?) so the respondent in this case was the executor. Service was made to the executor’s wife at the executor’s home. The service to the executor’s wife was in compliance with federal law but not Massachusetts state law.
Issue:
Whether, in a civil action involving diversity of citizenship between parties, service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(2)(B), in pertinent part, allows for the the summons and complaint to be left with a competent adult at the residence of any defendant.
The Massachusetts General Laws (Ter.Ed.) Chapter 197, Section 9, in pertinent part, requires service to be hand delivered upon the executor or administrator and accepted by him.
According to the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958 ed.), “The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions.” “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, and shall preserve the right of trial by jury. . . .”
Analysis (Chief Justice Warren):
The Court drew a distinction between substantive laws and non-substantive or procedural rules as regards diversity jurisdiction.
Non-substantial rules are not likely to raise the sort of equal protection issues that troubled the Court in Erie. They are also not likely to influence the choice of forum.
“Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.”
Held:
Congress’s attempt to exercise the power outlined in the Enabling Act is valid, and thus applied to this case.
Note: Whereas Erie was a Constitutional issue, Hanna is one of statutory construction. What does the statute tell the federal courts to do? The Rules, it can be argued, are not themselves statutes but statute-like rules.
1976, April 27
Entrapment Case Where the Government Supplied All the Drugs
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)
Some of you might remember from the “Week of April 18” edition of “On This Day” the case United States v. Russell, a 1973 entrapment case where the court made the distinction between entrapping an unwary innocent and an unwary criminal. Hampton takes place three years later.
Facts:
Petitioner sold heroin to an undercover DEA agent. According to petitioner, a) the drugs were provided by a DEA informant to sell to a DEA agent, b) he was told by the DEA informant that it was a nonnarcotic counterfeit drug, not the real thing.
The jury was instructed that in order to convict the Government needs to prove “that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law.” The jury found him guilty.
Petitioner argues that the jury should have been instructed that they must acquit him if it’s found that the government supplied the drugs.
Issue:
Whether a defendant may be convicted for the sale of a contraband which he procured from a government informer or agent.
Rule:
Under Russell, the statutory defense of entrapment is not available where the defendant had the established intent or predisposition to commit the crime, even where the government supplied a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illegal substance.
Analysis (Justice Rehnquist):
The difference between this case and Russell is one of degree not of kind.
“The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant.”
Here, the police, the Government informant, and the defendant acted in concert with one another. “[T]he government did not implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offence and induce its commission.”
“If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.”
Held:
Defendant was not deprived of his rights.
Dissent (Justice Brennan):
This case is significantly distinguished from Russell in two ways: 1) The chemical supplied by the government in Russell was not contraband, whereas here the government supplied the illegal narcotic that was being sold. 2) Russell’s crime was participation in an ongoing operation, whereas here the sales petitioner was convicted for were instigated by Government agents and completed by the Government’s purchase (both the beginning and the end of the crime).
1986, April 30
Peremptory Challenges Cannot Be Based Solely On Race
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
Facts:
During the trial of a black man in Kentucky, peremptory challenges were used to dismiss the remaining four black jurists in a trial, leaving an all white jury. Defendant objected to this as a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge denied this plea and the all white jury found the defendant guilty.
Issue:
Whether the defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. (Or, put another way, what is the burden?)
Rule:
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross section in jury selection must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.
The State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.
The “invidious quality” of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory “must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.
Side note: The Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremptory challenges.
Analysis (Justice Powell):
As an equal protection case, the burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. However, a black defendant may make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, at which point the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that “permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.”
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor’s removal of all black persons on the venire. Because the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction be reversed.
Held:
Swain’s holding requiring defendant to demonstrate systematic exclusion is overturned.
1995, April 26
Limits of the Commerce Clause — In Defense of Federalism
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
Facts:
A 12th-grade student brought a concealed .38-calibert handgun and five bullets to school. Somebody informed on him and he was arrested and charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. However, the next day the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged him under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
Issue:
Whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 “substantially effects” interstate commerce.
Rule:
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: It is a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.
Under its commerce power Congress may regulate 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce, 2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate commerce, 3) those activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
In order for a law to fall under Congress’s commerce powers, the activities it seeks to regulate must have a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Analysis (Chief Justice Rehnquist):
Unless Congress explicitly conveys its purpose as a commerce clause purpose, it will not be deemed to have justified that purpose. In this case, neither the statute nor its legislative history implicates the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone.
The government argues, that firearms in schools may result in violent crime that could a) affect the national economy by raising insurance rates, b) reduce the willingness of individuals to travel to parts of the country perceived to be unsafe, and c) threaten the learning environment, resulting in a less productive citizenry which in turn would have an adverse effect on the Nation’s economic well-being.
The Court counters that, if we accept this argument, then there is no limit to the federal power. These arguments could be used to justify almost anything.
Held:
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.
Dissent (Justice Breyer)
Breyer applies three principles of Commerce Clause interpretation. 1) The power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” encompasses the power to regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce. 2) In determining whether a local activity will likely have a significant effect upon interstate commerce, a court must consider, not the effect of an individual act (a single instance of gun possession), but rather the cumulative effect of all similar instances (i.e., the effect of all guns possessed in or near schools). 3) The question should be not whether the “regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,” but, rather, whether Congress could have had “a rational basis” for so concluding.
Note:
This case had a number of long concurrences and dissents. More than we have time for here.
MAHALO MUCHO!!!
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